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Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellín, Colombia, are large urban cities that have 
struggled with public insecurity caused by illegal armed groups. Both have developed 
new programs to address areas of violence and parts of the cities that have become 
marginalized. In Brazil, the State Secretary for Public Security of Rio de Janeiro is 
implementing the Pacifying Police Unit program. In Colombia, the program is called the 
Medellín Model and originated out of the mayor’s office. This thesis uses a comparative 
analysis to describe how each country’s transition to democracy, police structure, and 
political structure influenced the development and shape of each program.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellín, Colombia, are both large urban cities 
challenged by crime and public insecurity.1 In view of the challenge posed by public 
insecurity, the two cities have adopted seemingly dissimilar approaches to cope with 
crime. Brazil has implemented the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) program, which is based 
on the assumption that the police needed to retake the territory of the favelas, the city’s 
slums, to reestablish physical security before social issues could be addressed.2 By 
contrast, Colombia has adopted the so-called Medellín Model, which is based mostly on a 
societal, bottom-up approach to address the social issues that contribute to crime and 
insecurity, such as poverty, lack of education, marginalization.3 This thesis aims to 
compare and contrast both anti-crime programs. How different are they? How did they 
evolve? If they are indeed different, why did both cities adopt such different approaches 
to a similar challenge (public insecurity and crime)?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Public security has increasingly become a major issue of concern in many Latin 
American countries.4 In this context, specific sectors of Brazil and Colombia have been 
                                                 
1 “City Population by Sex, City and City Type,” accessed December 10, 2013, http://data.un.org/Data. 
aspx?d=PO&f=tableCode%3A240.  
2 Leandro Piquet Carneiro, “The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro: A Study in Leadership and 
Innovation” (working paper, Lemann Dialogue, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, 2012), http://nupps.usp.br/downloads/relatorio/Anexo_34_Piquet_for_Lehman_Seminar 
_Pacification_Policy_jan_13.pdf; Pacifying Police Unit, “About,” accessed September 1, 2013; 
http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp_us. 
3 Agency of Cooperation and Investment of Medellín and the Metropolitan Area-ACI, “Introduction: 
Medellín: A Model of Integral Social Development and a Laboratory City,” in Medellín Laboratory: An 
Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de 
Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 22–23. 
4 Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, ed., Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to 
Democracy in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 1–2; Niels Uildriks, 
“Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America: An Introduction,” in Policing Insecurity: 
Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America, ed. Niels Uildriks (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2009), 4–5. 
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greatly affected by organized crime and insecurity.5 For instance, from 1996 to 2006, Rio 
de Janeiro reported an average homicide rate of 50 per 100,000, which is well above the 
national average of 30 per 100,000.6 The government is now attempting to address the 
challenges faced by those who live in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas through the 
implementation of UPPs, which were first instituted in 2008.7 Likewise, in 1991, 
Medellín had a homicide rate of 391 per 100,000, which was nearly four times the 
national average.8 Since then, the homicide rate has dropped to 55 per 100,000 in 2010, a 
reduction that has been partially attributed to the so-called Medellín model.9  
An examination of public security models in Latin America is relevant for a 
number of reasons. First, most of the public policy programs, such as those instituted in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, have coincided with the expansion 
of democracy, welfare, and the middle class.10 In other words, governmental decisions on 
how to tackle crime have been shaped by a number of new political and societal factors, 
including democratization and demographic changes. In this thesis, a comparative study 
of Rio de Janeiro’s and Medellín’s anti-crime program can help identify the conditions 
under which societal factors can shape policy outcomes. Indeed, this thesis analyzes why 
the Medellín model is often perceived as a bottom-up approach to public security. 
Second, as previously indicated, although the challenges posed by crime are 
similar, the responses by governments and public administrations in the region are not. 
                                                 
5 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 2. 
6 Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and 
Public Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 1; United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, “Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data,” 2011, 78, http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.  
7 Pacifying Police Unit, “About” and “History,” accessed August 26, 2013, http://www.upprj.com/
index.php/historico_us. 
8 Myriam Merchan Bonnilla and Oscar Arcos Palma, “Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. 
Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can,” in Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices, 
ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 
2011), 54; Jota Samper, “Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Medellín, 
Colombia,” Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Project, May 2012, http://s3.amazonaws. 
com/academia.edu.documents/30887962/Medellin_URCV.pdf?A. 
9 Bonnilla, “Strategy for the Territorialization of Security,” 54. 
10 Uildriks, “Police Reform,” 5–6. 
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Thus, this thesis aims to understand policy variations better within Latin American 
countries. Why did Rio de Janeiro and Medellín develop such different programs? What 
factors shaped such policy divergences among seemingly similar countries in the region? 
In other words, why do the Rio and Medellín models vary so much in scope and 
approach? The answers to these questions can help policymakers in the region better 
understand the host of factors that help shape policy in their own country and in other 
countries. 
Finally, this thesis sheds some light on the ongoing discussion about how to 
improve public security conditions in Latin America. Given that so many police models 
have appeared in the region; comparing them might assist in identifying their level of 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis tests and assesses two sets of hypotheses. First, this study examines 
how different patterns of democratization have shaped and affected public security 
programs in both Brazil and Colombia. Although both Latin American countries are 
currently considered democratic, they underwent different processes of democratization.  
Brazil has experienced a different form of political development, in which the 
recent legacies of authoritarianism are perhaps more present than in Medellín. The 
author, therefore, hypothesizes that Brazil’s policing approach was conceived during the 
dictatorship, and thus, contains remnants from that era.11 In fact, Brazil’s police force is 
made of two main groups, the military police (MP) and civil police (CP), with the UPPs 
being a contingent of the MP.12 The MP is responsible for crime prevention and order 
while the CP is responsible for investigating crimes and criminal proceedings.13 Each 
state’s governor provides guidance to the MP through the state secretary for public 
                                                 
11 Mercedes S. Hinton, “A Distant Reality: Democratic Policing in Argentina and Brazil,” Criminal 
Justice 5, no. 1 (2005): 82, 94–95. 
12 Hinton, “A Distant Reality,” 86; Pacifying Police Unit, “About.”   
13 Hinton, “A Distant Reality,” 82–86. 
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security.14 Even after the transition to democracy, the MP maintains a legacy of 
autonomy from civilian accountability, as its members are tried in military courts for 
anything less than murder and significant civilian oversight is lacking.15 The lack of 
accountability to the public and the hierarchical structure of the MP partially explain why 
the UPP program was developed by the State Secretary for Public Security of Rio de 
Janeiro as a “top down” program instead of up from the city level.16 Police autonomy 
encouraged the development of a security program that complemented the existing 
approach and structure of the police rather than one that includes significant 
restructuring. 
By contrast, Colombia’s longer history of democratic rule has left fewer traces of 
authoritarianism, which might have contributed to the development of a “bottom up” 
approach to public security. Different patterns of political development may explain why 
the Colombian government has given significant control to the country’s mayors over the 
dispersal of funds and the local police force.17 The police in Colombia have been 
organized into a national force under civilian control even though it falls under the 
Ministry of National Defense.18 In Medellín, the police have a 20-year history of 
community policing, which contributes to a closer interaction with the local 
community.19 These factors have contributed to the Medellín Model coming from 
Medellín’s mayor and citizen organizations.20 
                                                 
14 Fiona Macaulay, “Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil” (CBS Working Paper 33-02, Centre for 
Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2002), 6–7, http://lac-live.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/ 
documents/Macaulay33.pdf.  
15 Hinton, “A Distant Reality,” 89; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, “Democratic Governance, Violence, and the 
(Un)Rule of Law,” Daedalus 129, no. 2 (2000): 122, 127; Arthur Trindade Maranhao Costa, “Police 
Brutality in Brazil: Authoritarian Legacy or Institutional Weakness?,” Latin American Perspectives 38, no. 
19 (2011): 29–30. 
16 Carneiro, “The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro.”  
17 Francisco Gutierrez et al., “The Importance of Political Coalitions in the Successful Reduction of 
Violence in Colombian Cities,” Urban Studies 50, no. 15 (2013): 3137–3138. 
18 Juan Carlos Ruiz Vasquez, “Colombian Police Under Fire: Image, Corruption and Controls,” 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 36, no. 2 (2013): 400. 
19 Samper, “Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence,” 11–12. 
20 Gutierrez et al., “The Importance of Political Coalitions,” 3139. 
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The second set of hypotheses to be explored in this thesis deal with the type of 
philosophy that drives both public security programs. For instance, the author argues that 
the philosophy of the UPP program focuses on achieving public security in each favela 
through a series of waves.21 The first wave includes members of the Special Police 
Operations Battalion (BOPE) and the military coming into the favela in force to push out 
the drug traffickers and organized crime.22 Once some level of physical security is 
achieved, the UPPs are established and followed by public services, social programs, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO).23 The UPP program is a public security program 
that establishes physical security first, and then is followed by the implementation of 
social and welfare issues through UPP Social.24 UPP Social coordinates the activities of 
the mayor’s office, federal government, and NGOs to establish public utility services, 
promote economic integration, facilitate social benefits, and support community 
involvement.25 In contrast, the philosophy of the Medellín Model focuses on addressing 
the social issues that contribute to criminal behavior and the absence of the state through 
public work projects.26 The Medellín model addresses social issues and security 
simultaneously with formal community involvement, such as Young Force, Youth with 
Future, Local Governance Committees (LGC), and the Local Planning and Participative 
Budget Program.27  
                                                 
21 Robert Muggah and Albert Walter Souza Mulli, “Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets: 
Counter-Insurgency in Rio de Janeiro,” in Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of 




24 Carneiro, “The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro.” 
25 Pacifying Police Unit Social, “About,” accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.uppsocial.org/ 
about/.   
26 Luisa Sotomayor, “Medellín: The New Celebrity?,” Spatial Planning in Latin America, last 
modified August 26, 2013, http://planninglatinamerica.wordpress.com/2013/08/26/Medellín-the-new-
celebrity.  
27 Gutierrez et al., “The Importance of Political Coalitions,” 3143; Bonnilla, “Strategy for the 
Territorialization of Security,” 57, 61; Agency of Cooperation and Investment, “Introduction,” 27. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review draws on the contribution that Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, 
Narcís Serra, Mark Ungar, and Claudio A. Fuentes make to the knowledge of police 
reform in Latin America. Linz and Stepan describe how the regime type and nature of 
transition to democracy impacts the following government.28 Serra writes about the 
impact civilian-military relations have on democratic consolidation after the transition 
from a military regime.29 Ungar provides a descriptive analysis of the interaction of 
politics, institutions, and society in the area of security reform.30 Fuentes examines the 
opportunities and challenges for the civil rights coalition and pro-order coalition to 
influence policy outcomes using a new-institutionalism approach.31 
1. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
Linz and Stepan describe how the type of nondemocratic regime and the factors 
of the transition influence the consolidation of democracy.32 In their analysis of 
nondemocratic regimes, they include authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and 
sultanistic, but for purposes of this thesis, the focus is on their views on authoritarian 
regimes.33 Linz and Stepan further develop the idea that a hierarchical military that leads 
a nondemocratic regime and has integrated itself into the routine functions of the state are 
less motivated to remove itself from controlling the government.34 If the opposition 
coalition is weak, then the military is able to set the terms to favor itself during the 
transition to democracy, which can include protection from the consequences of human 
                                                 
28 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 
54–56. 
29 Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, trans. Peter Bush 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1. 
30 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 18. 
31 Claudio A. Fuentes, Contesting the Iron Fist: Advocacy Networks and Police Violence in 
Democratic Argentina and Chile (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7, 46–47.  
32 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 38. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 67. 
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rights violations.35 Linz and Stepan utilize Brazil as an example, and state that compared 
to other countries in the study that includes Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, “Brazil has 
experienced the most difficulty in consolidating democracy.”36 In Brazil, the military 
took 16 years to transition control to civilian leadership, and according to Linz and 
Stepan’s view, the transition was not complete until 1990.37 Since the military initiated 
the transition and a strong opposition was not pushing them out, it was able to control the 
pace and the terms that allowed it to leave a lasting impact on the new government’s 
constitution.38 Thus, if a hierarchical military has been in charge for a long time, and is 
able to set the terms for its transition from power, then it will be able to leave a lasting 
influence on the institutions of the state. 
2. Narcís Serra 
Serra draws on his experience as Spain’s minister of defense during the transition 
from a military regime to democratic rule to develop an understanding of how civilian-
military relations impact democratic consolidation.39 Serra adopts a normative approach 
to develop what steps a post-transition government can take to complete the transition to 
a consolidated democracy in which the government leads the military and not the other 
way around.40 The military can undermine the institutionalization of democracy by 
maintaining autonomy from the government and limiting its ability to take charge of 
political decisions.41 Serra believes that “consolidation occurs when the elected civilian 
government is able to establish military and defence policies, ensures they are 
implemented and directs the activities of the armed forces.”42 To facilitate consolidation, 
the civilian government will implement military reform that will transition the military 
                                                 
35 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 67–68. 
36 Ibid., 166. 
37 Ibid., 168. 
38 Ibid., 168–69. 
39 Serra, The Military Transition, 1. 
40 Ibid., 3, 16. 
41 Ibid., 16. 
42 Ibid., 28. 
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along a path toward greater civilian oversight and less military autonomy.43 Key steps 
along that path include limiting the military’s influence over civilian organizations like 
the police and remodeling the military justice system.44 That former step is still 
outstanding in both Brazil and Colombia because the police fall under their respective 
ministers of defense and the latter step remains to be taken in Brazil because the MP has 
impunity from civilian courts since it is covered by the military justice system.45 
3. Max Ungar 
Ungar develops an intricate structure for investigating areas of reforms, realms of 
change, challenges to reform, and strategies to overcome challenges, which provides 
useful definitions of the different styles of policing and five focus areas when looking at 
police reform.46 He groups the challenges to citizen security into “institutional relations, 
daily policing, and the spectrum of reform.”47 Using Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina as 
cases, Ungar goes into a detailed analysis of the successes and failures of security reform 
in each country, but fails to delve into the underlying reasons for these results. Fuentes 
does not focus on the different facets of security reform that Ungar does, but provides 
analysis into the factors that influence the contest between civil rights and public security 
in policy development.48  
Mark Ungar describes three different styles of policing, which include traditional 
policing, problem-oriented policing, and community policing.49 These different styles are 
not exclusive from each other, but rather can be implemented at the same time to varying 
degrees.50 Therefore, a policing program can have characteristics of traditional policing 
and problem-oriented policing, but the more aspects of one strategy used will cause less 
                                                 
43 Serra, The Military Transition, 44. 
44 Ibid., 74, 83. 
45 Hinton, “A Distant Reality,” 89; Pinheiro, “Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of 
Law,” 122, 127; Maranhao Costa, “Police Brutality in Brazil,” 29–30. 
46 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 325. 
47 Ibid., 11. 
48 Fuentes, Contesting the Iron Fist, 1. 
49 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 4–5. 
50 Ibid., 5–6. 
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of the other strategy to be used. Traditional policing is characterized by executive control, 
vertical hierarchy, professionalization, and quick response to criminal acts.51 It focuses 
on reacting to criminal acts and establishing control while problem-oriented policing 
works to understand the factors that influence crime and then address those factors.52 The 
process of problem-oriented policing is an analytical approach that involves the police 
categorizing different crimes and then focusing on crime groups instead of individual 
crimes.53 Ungar provides an excellent contrast between these two styles when he writes, 
“Beyond aiming for particular goals or more efficiency, problem-oriented policing is 
about forging a new more flexible internal disposition geared toward processing 
problems beyond the traditional triad of patrol, detention, and investigation.”54  
Community policing is the most recently developed style of policing.55 Like 
problem-oriented policing, community policing focuses on prevention versus control, but 
with community policing, the local citizens are incorporated into the approach to public 
security.56 Citizens are included in the establishment of security through community 
watch groups, citizen-police councils, and community education programs.57 As the 
program is implemented, police are reorganized to allow greater autonomy for the local 
officers to respond to the needs of the local community.58 Community policing also 
incorporates other aspects of the state by “decentralizing social services to the local level 
and formally incorporating them into crime policy.”59 Although community policing can 
be seen as a final goal, Ungar suggests that the development of problem-oriented policing 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 4, 33. 
52 Ibid., 6.  
53 Ibid., 5. 
54 Ibid., 6. 
55 Ibid., 4. 
56 Ibid., 9.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 9–10. 
59 Ibid., 10.  
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procedures provides the means to transform traditional policing, as well as improve 
democracy and citizen security.60 
Ungar’s framework for the five areas of security reform includes: “(1) agency 
restructuring, (2) professional support, (3) control mechanisms, (4) legal changes, and (5) 
community policing.”61 Agency restructuring involves organizational change designed to 
make “the police more accountable, more professional, and more efficient.”62 It is 
focused on decentralizing control, increasing specialization around police functions, and 
simplifying hierarchy.63 Professional support includes better training, technological 
support, and pay.64 Control mechanism reforms increase public transparency of police 
operations, as well as police accountability to society.65 These controls can come from 
the creation of agencies that provide oversight within or outside of the police.66 Legal 
change can modify what is considered illegal and how the police respond to illegal acts.67 
These changes can influence the whole judicial system through shifting responsibility, 
authority, and judicial procedures.68 Community policing reforms include changes in 
policing that increase the incorporation of citizens into the security process.69  
4. Claudio A. Fuentes 
Claudio A. Fuentes’s framework focuses on the interaction between the civil 
rights coalition and the pro-order coalition as they try to influence policy outcome.70 The 
civil rights coalition is made up of all politicians, lawyers, advocacy network, and human 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 324. 
61 Ibid., 5. 
62 Ibid., 7. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 8. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 8–9. 
68 Ibid., 8. 
69 Ibid., 9. 
70 Fuentes, Contesting the Iron Fist, 41.  
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rights groups that work to improve civil rights and protection for citizens.71 The pro-
order coalition is made up of all politicians, state bureaucrats, and police that try to 
maintain social order through ensuring limited restrictions are put on the police.72 The 
ability of each coalition to influence policy comes from the political opportunity structure 
and the coalition’s capacity for resource mobilization.73 Fuentes defines the political 
opportunity structure by “the nature of the transition to democracy, access to the political 
system, and the structure of the police.”74 The transition to democracy leaves its impact 
on the nature of institutions and its ability to address human rights issues.75 Political 
access affects the ability of the human rights group to influence political leaders and the 
pro-order group to resist change.76 Police structure can make it more or less responsive to 
civilian influence, which can improve its ability to resist police reform.77 The political 
opportunity structure is key to the analysis provided in this thesis.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis provides a comparative study of the development of the Medellín 
Model and UPP program. Colombia and Brazil face similar challenges of crime, poverty, 
and drug traffickers, but have developed different approaches to addressing these issues. 
The focus is on how the political history, political structure and police structure of both 
Colombia and Brazil influenced their individual police reform. This research focuses 
primarily on secondary sources, which include published books, newspaper articles, and 
articles from academic journals. These sources also include documents that describe their 
political history and structure with special attention to their democratic transitions. 
Included as well are writings that detail the history of policing and how each police 
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reform developed. Primary sources include facts and figures from international, 
governmental, and NGOs, such as the United Nations and World Bank.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis addresses the public security reforms in Brazil and Colombia by 
analyzing them individually and then comparing them to each other. The chapter on Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil explores Brazil’s history of military rule and its lingering impact, 
Brazil’s police structure and heritage, and the UPP program. The chapter on Medellín, 
Colombia examines Colombia’s police structure and accountability, Colombia’s history 
of military rule, and the different facets of the Medellín Model. Each public security 
reform is analyzed for the different programs that make it up and how the program came 
to be developed. The next chapter illustrates how the two programs are similar and how 




II. RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Brazil currently has the seventh-largest economy in the world, but struggles to 
ensure public security to the point where it is among the world’s most dangerous 
countries.78 The challenges to public security include income inequality, meeting social 
needs, and dealing with drug-trafficking networks.79 From 1996 to 2006, Rio de Janeiro 
has reported an average homicide rate of 50 per 100,000, but the favelas have an even 
higher homicide rate.80 Beginning in 2008, the government worked to address the 
challenges faced by those who live in the favelas through the implementation of the UPP 
program.81 Its policing history and structure contributed to the development of a “top 
down” public security program instead of one that was developed from the city level or 
up from the community level. Brazil’s security philosophy inclined the program to focus 
on the establishment of physical security first and then address social issues second.82  
B. MILITARY RULE 
Brazil was under an authoritarian military regime from 1964 until 1985.83 The 
military staged a coup in 1964 to overthrow the government of João Goulart, due to 
concerns over the country’s economic instability and the growing influence of the 
political left.84 During these 21 years, the military exerted influence over all aspects of 
the Brazilian government to include the structure of the political landscape and public 
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security.85 Brazil’s transition back from military rule to democratic rule did not take 
place through a rapid collapse of the authoritarian government, but through a slow 
process of the military releasing control and allowing political processes to operate 
democratically. Part of the reason that the military accepted this reduction in power is 
that the military saw the coup as a temporary necessity because of its “self-perception as 
arbiters and guarantors of political order.”86 During this slow transition, the military tried 
to organize the structure of political parties and election process to favor itself, but when 
they realized that the public would vote against the military backed party, they allowed 
the democratization process to continue.87 Since the military controlled the pace of the 
transition to democracy, it was able to control the terms of the process and ensured that 
government personnel involved in torture and crimes against humanity were granted 
amnesty.88 Instead of having the institutional structure created by the government torn 
down and reformed following the military being removed from power, the military was 
able to influence the transition, which allowed its influence on institutions and 
democratic institution building to remain. One of the main institutions that maintained the 
imprint of the military’s influence was the Brazilian police. 
C. BRAZIL’S POLICE 
The structure of Brazil’s political and judicial system influences the organization 
of its police.89 Brazil’s police force is made of two main groups, the (MP and CP, with 
the UPP being a contingent of the MP.90 The MP is responsible for crime prevention and 
ensuring order while the CP is responsible for investigating crimes and criminal 
proceedings.91 Between the MP and CP, the MP is significantly larger because it contains 
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“78 per cent of all state police personnel.”92 The country’s penal codes are developed at 
the federal level, but the police agencies are directed and funded at the state level of 
government.93 The split between the federal and state authority creates a gap that limits 
the ability of the state government to shape the police structure because they do not 
institute the penal codes.94 There have been “proposals for the institutional integration of 
the police… brought before Congress but have thus far failed to advance.”95 The reason 
for this failure is the “weakness of the institutional mechanisms for controlling police 
activity.”96 During Brazil’s dictatorship, the police were under the guidance of the 
military, but authority was eventually transferred to the State Secretary for Public 
Security during the transition to democracy.97 This authority is not extensive though 
because the police maintain significant “budgetary and functional autonomy.”98 
Organizational autonomy allows the police to hold influence over what reforms are 
adopted and how significant of a change is created. This autonomy allows the police to 
resist outside influence and oversight from government officials. 
1. Military Heritage 
Brazil’s policing approach was originally conceived during the dictatorship and 
contains remnants from that era even though it has evolved to some extent.99 During the 
transition to democracy, the police force was given protection from prosecution for rights 
violations committed during the authoritarian regime, which allowed the existing 
leadership to remain in place.100 Maintaining the leaders who were in command during 
the military regime allows the culture developed during that time to persist. The police 
accountability that does exist is provided by “four distinct police oversight mechanisms, 
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located in three separate branches of government… the judiciary (military courts), the 
executive (internal affairs department and the ombudsman’s office attached to the police 
department), and the Ministério Público (prosecution service) a peculiarly Brazilian 
institution that is functionally separate from both judiciary and executive and often 
termed a ‘forth power.’”101 Although the structures for police accountability exist, little 
accountability is in practice. 
The MP maintains a legacy of autonomy from civilian accountability because its 
members are tried in military courts for anything less than intentional homicide.102 The 
military courts inherently lack civilian oversight because military personnel are in charge 
of all aspects of criminal investigation and prosecution.103 Control over the investigation 
phase is key because the military personnel are responsible for determining whether a 
homicide was intentional or if it was in the line of duty.104A military heritage of valuing 
good order and discipline also remains, which results in harsh punishment for minor 
infractions and deference for the organizational hierarchy.105 The insulation provided by 
the military court systems allows major infractions like torture to be addressed within the 
police structure, which may result in the offenders losing their job, but will not likely lead 
to criminal charges.106 Fiona Macaulay writes, “As a result many violent policemen end 
up as private security guards, or even rejoin the force in another state.”107 The military 
court system is one of the biggest contributors to police autonomy and impunity. The 
autonomy afforded by military courts that applies to the MP applies to the UPP as well 
because the UPP are a branch of the MP. 
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2. Police Accountability 
The internal affairs department is responsible for investigating accusations against 
police officers, but since they are also police officers, they can be pressured by the police 
chief to protect the reputation of the organization.108 A large number of complaints are 
misplaced, downplayed, or dismissed outright as a result of this peer influence.109 Even if 
the internal affairs department had the autonomy to conduct unbiased investigations, it 
tends to be poorly funded and under staffed.110 Those assigned to internal affairs also 
face the challenge of returning to the regular police force and possibly working with the 
friends of people they may have investigated and possibly charged with violations.111 In 
the 1990s, the ombudsman’s office was created to try to add some independence to 
internal oversight, but it has not been significantly successful.112 Although civilians staff 
it, the ombudsman’s office lacks sufficient authority to ensure police accountability due 
to being unable to conduct investigations or prosecute offenders.113 Even though it can 
do little on its own, the ombudsman’s office’s most significant impact comes from 
bringing information about accusations to the public’s attention and passing the 
information to the Ministério Público.114 
The Ministério Público was given substantial power in the 1988 Constitution and 
is an important source of accountability.115 It is not only responsible for providing 
oversight for the police, but “is also tasked with defending the legal order, ensuring that 
the authorities respect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and protecting the 
democratic regime, public patrimony, and ‘diffuse and collective rights.’”116 Although it 
has made significant strides in confronting political corruption, the Ministério Público has 
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not challenged problems within the police.117 Part of the reason lies in the structure of 
Brazil’s judicial process. Brazil has a two-phase judicial process with the first phase 
being an investigation, which is usually conducted by the police, and a prosecution phase, 
which involves the judicial staff and the point at which the Ministério Público can 
become involved.118 If the Ministério Público inserts itself into the first phase, it meets 
significant and sometimes active resistance from the police.119 Situations have occurred 
in which the police have barred personnel of the Ministério Público from gaining access 
to police stations during their investigations.120 Another reason is that the Ministério 
Público has a broadly defined mission and is not required to focus solely on police 
misconduct, but it does have the capability to provide needed accountability.121 The 
weakness of Brazil’s oversight institutions contributes to the police being unresponsive to 
calls for change from the community and only moderately responsive to reforms coming 
from the state government. 
3. Police and Military Joint Operations 
Tied to the lack of accountability for the police is the tendency to use the military 
to stabilize neighborhoods and an absence of community policing activity.122 The 
military was brought into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to prevent disturbances 
during the United Nations Earth Summit.123 In 1994 during Operation Rio, the military 
was used to provide the force necessary to suppress drug traffickers.124 Troops were 
called again into Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in 2002 to ensure smooth elections, and in 
2004, to quell a gang war.125 Saima Husain provides an excellent description of Brazil’s 
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heritage when she writes, “Efforts to police Rio’s favelas have historically involved the 
traditional militarized model of policing. This typically consists of entering favelas 
heavily armed and in force, using brutal repressive tactics against its residents, and 
engaging in shoot-outs with suspected drug traffickers that often leave many civilians 
dead or injured.”126 The heavy use of the military stands counter to the effort to 
implement community policing practices in Brazil, but coordinated operations between 
the police and military is a key aspect of the UPP program. 
4. Community Policing 
Community policing was first implemented in 1983, but because of disordered 
implementation, and a lack of commitment when political administrations changed, it 
was cancelled in 1987.127 The strategy was attempted again in 1991 in Grajaú and 
Copacabana in 1994, but without lasting results.128 The application of community 
policing tends to be in limited parts of the state and relies on volunteers from the police 
force to be assigned to these specific programs.129 The extent of the programs is so 
limited that one police battalion may have community policing in one area and then 
traditional policing in another.130 Brazil’s reliance on a traditional policing strategy and 
failure to develop a significant community policing program has contributed to a lack of 
mechanism for the police to receive input from or be influenced by the community. This 
lack of accountability to the local populace has contributed to the police only being 
trusted by approximately 25 percent of the population, but the development of the UPP 
program does mark a change.131  
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D. PACIFYING POLICE UNITS 
The police in Brazil face significant challenges toward increasing its 
accountability to the public and adopting community policing, but the UPP program does 
have the benefit of being an innovative policing organization made up of brand new 
policemen.132 Bringing in new policemen provides the possibility of having a different 
culture and mindset in the UPP than is seen in the rest of the MP. Each UPP has its own 
separate headquarters from the rest of the MP and its own police bases as well.133 
Although the UPPs are administratively connected to a MP Battalion, this process works 
to decentralize the control of the UPP to the headquarters that reside in the communities 
being pacified.134 The police of the UPP actively incorporate the principles of 
community policing and work to establish dialogue with the residents to address the 
unique issues that exist in each favela.135 Once physical security has been established, 
public services are brought into the neighborhood to help incorporate the favela into the 
infrastructure and institutions of the surrounding city.136 The UPP program includes a 
branch of City Hall devoted to addressing these social issues known as UPP Social.137 
UPP Social helps to facilitate the provision of services to the favelas and organizes 
community involvement.138 This process addresses the social concerns of the community 
while the UPP focuses on physical security. Involved in implementing the UPP program 
is agency restructuring, professional support, control mechanisms, and the development 
of community policing. These changes are positive, but they are limited by the 
institutional inertia of the police and its ability to limit attempts at reform from the 
outside of the organization. 
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As the program was developed, it worked to stay within the judicial and police 
framework that existed instead of trying to develop a program that required significant 
federal and state reform.139 This requirement was created by the autonomy of the police 
and how previous attempts at significant reform had failed. It worked to mold together a 
program that incorporated the crime control of traditional policing with the principles of 
community policing.140 The philosophy of the program is shown in its four basic goals: 
(1) police coercion was to be used against the armed criminal gangs that 
had taken control of certain “territories” (2) police activity was to be 
raised to a level where it was no longer worth engaging in criminal 
activities (3) the police were to be granted a permanent presence in 
pacified communities (4) support was to be given by the police for policies 
of social inclusion being introduced by other agencies.141 
These goals were inspired by military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well 
as Brazil’s own experience during peacekeeping operations in Haiti.142 The continued 
influence of a military mindset is shown in the use of the military to occupy favelas like 
Complexo do Alemão in 2010 and 2012.143 The security issues of the favelas were 
influenced by a military perspective, which contributed to the program’s focus on 
physical security. 
The program was also influenced by the views of Rio de Janeiro Governor Sérgio 
Cabral, whose “security policy was described as a ‘policy of confrontation’ in the press 
and was described by Amnesty International as ‘draconian and aggressive.’” 144 The 
physical security provided by pacification is seen as raising the cost of crime to change 
the focus of youth from short-term gains like criminal activity to long-term gains like 
education.145 The philosophy was shaped to meet the challenges faced in the Brazilian 
political system, which relies heavily on coalitions to the point that a minority can disrupt 
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the process.146 The program needed its philosophy to be aligned with the influential MP 
lobby.147 One way that the MP lobby was appeased was that those participating in the 
UPPs would receive extra pay.148 They also shaped the philosophy to appeal to the 
politicians who believed the public wanted a heavy-handed response to crime.149 Due to 
these influences, the UPP program is a public security program that establishes physical 
security first, and then is followed by addressing social issues rather than addressing them 
simultaneously.150 
It is the responsibility of UPP Social to address social issues in the favelas, but it 
seems to be more of an afterthought because UPP Social was not developed until two 
years after the UPP program was introduced.151 When UPP Social begins to work in a 
favela, it sets up meetings with local leaders, neighborhood associations, and the public in 
general over several weeks.152 UPP Social then brings in a team to perform a 
socioeconomic analysis of the favela to identify the major issues of the community and to 
establish a baseline.153 After the information is gathered, an open forum is held with the 
community, UPP leaders, and municipal representatives to highlight concerns and discuss 
possible plans.154 Once the this initial stage is complete, two to three UPP Social officials 
remain attached to the favela to coordinate the efforts of government agencies and 
monitor the progress of the plan.155 Although UPP Social does ask for input from the 
community, some residents in the Vidigal favela are concerned that UPP Social’s plans 
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tend to focus on formalizing utility services and stopping utility theft instead of the 
community’s priorities of better schools, healthcare, and police accountability.156 
E. TRENDS 
The implementation of the UPP program has come with both positive and 
negative results. One of the positives is the drop in homicides seen in pacified 
communities. Between 2006 and 2011, favelas with UPP units have seen a 78 percent 
drop in the number of homicides.157 In Rio de Janeiro, the homicide rate went from 37.8 
per 100,000 in 2007 to 20.5 per 100,000 in 2013, which was in part due to the 
introduction of UPPs.158 Robberies have decreased by 15 percent with the 
implementation of UPPs.159 Despite the drop in homicides and robberies, crimes, such as 
threats, domestic violence, and rape have increased in pacified favelas, which could be in 
part to the removal of the informal rules violently enforced by local drug lords.160 
Between the presence of gangs and drug lords, residents tend to prefer the presence of the 
UPP even though it is not a perfect solution.161 Amnesty International recognizes that 
there were only “20 deaths as a result of police interventions in UPP areas in 2014, which 
is 85% lower than the number recorded in 2008 (136 fatalities).”162 Even with this drop 
in police related fatalities, UPP officers are still caught in episodes of corruption and 
                                                 
156 Carolyn Prouse, “Framing the World cUPP: Competing Discourses of Favela Pacification as a 
Mega-Event Legacy in Brazil,” Recreation and Society in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 3, no. 2 (2012): 
14–15, https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2715.  
157 “Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in 
Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process,” 39. 
158 Simon Romero and Taylor Barnes, “Rio Grapples with Violence against Police Officers as World 
Cup Nears,” New York Times, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/. 
159 “Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in 
Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process,” 39. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ioan Grillo, “Brazil’s Police Struggle to Pacify Gang-Run Slums,” Combating Terrorism Center 
Sentinel 7, no. 8 (2014): 16, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/brazils-police-struggle-to-pacify-gang-run-
slums.  
162 Amnesty International, You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de 
Janeiro (London: Amnesty International, 2015), 28. 
 24 
suspected in incidents of extrajudicial executions.163 Residents of pacified areas are also 
facing the challenges of gentrification because the favelas that have been the first to 
receive UPPs tend to be in areas adjacent to affluent neighborhoods or tourist areas.164 
Those who live in un-pacified favelas are worried that they will need to wait a long time 
to get a UPP unit because only 38 UPP units are established to cover 196 communities 
and 600,000 people, but the favelas number approximately 599 and it costs 
approximately US$ 567,000 per year to run a single unit.165 In Rio de Janeiro, concern is 
also raised as to whether the program will continue after the 2016 Olympics or if the UPP 
program was primarily a short-term solution to bring the Olympics to Brazil.166  
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III. MEDELLÍN, COLOMBIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Medellín Model has been managed by the city’s mayor and has been 
successfully maintained through three new administrations. It was founded during the 
administration of Sergio Fajardo, who served from 2004–2007. Alonso Salazar served as 
mayor from 2008–2011, and the current mayor is Anibal Gaviria. The Colombian 
Constitution was enacted in 1991, which gave increased political autonomy to mayors 
that helped provide the capacity for the mayors of Medellín to develop a new approach to 
addressing insecurity in their city.167 The Medellín Model is framed by public 
intervention in the areas of education, social urbanism, social inclusion, civic culture, 
security, and entrepreneurial culture.168 These areas are addressed through projects that 
often tackle multiple areas at once.169 The process for developing projects for the 
Medellín Model includes four steps, which begins with planning and monitoring through 
the use of calculated measurements.170 Two of these measurements used to analyze 
neighborhoods are the Human Development Index (HDI) and Quality of Life Survey 
Index (QLSI) because the focus is on substantive results to improve its programs 
continually.171 The second step is to ensure that the program is funded cost effectively 
and public resources are allocated in a transparent manner because public trust and local 
participation are cornerstones of the Medellín Model.172 One significant source of money 
is the city owned Municipal Utilities Company, which provides the city government with 
a source of revenue independent of taxes and the state.173 The third step merges political 
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goals with the guidance and participation of local leaders.174 The final step closes the 
feedback loop through the monitoring of the program and ensuring that the collected 
information drives the planning process, which ensures that the model will continue to 
innovate to address issues that persist and stay flexible to tackle new challenges. 
B. NEW PERSPECTIVE 
The Medellín Model originates out of “the idea of guaranteeing citizen security 
and coexistence through integration, convergence and social articulation among the 
Municipal administration, law enforcement and justice, private enterprise and organized 
civil society.”175 This perspective stands in contrast to the previous view that the local 
government did not have a part to play in addressing the problems of violence and social 
insecurity locally because the source of conflict was tied to illegal groups that operated 
throughout the country.176 That old view contributed to the local government 
withdrawing from the local community, which made it easier for guerrilla groups like the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces 
(AUC) to gain influence throughout the city.177 The first major step to reintegrate local 
government into previously marginalized areas of the city came in 2002 through action 
from the national level during Operation Orion, which came before the Medellín Model 
was developed.178 Operation Orion was a military and police operation that pushed 
guerilla groups out of Comuna 13 in Medellín and started the demobilization of local 
paramilitary groups.179 Although the national government helped with this first step, it 
was the local government that developed the Medellín Model and capitalized on the 
opportunity. 
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C. COLOMBIA’S POLICE 
The Colombian police are instrumental actors in the Medellín Model and are 
primarily responsible for confronting violence and improving physical security in the 
neighborhoods of Medellín. Ever since the 1960s, the police force of Colombia has 
operated as a national organization, which has allowed it some autonomy from the 
influence of the military and political parties.180 It has remained firmly as a civilian 
organization even though it technically falls under the Ministry of Defense.181 This 
separation of the police from the military has fostered Medellín’s police structure that has 
facilitated its transition toward community policing. 
The Colombian police maintain a high level of respect among the population even 
though it continues to be plagued by instances of corruption.182 Since the 1990s, the 
public’s trust in the police has improved from 21 percent to 48 percent, which is high in 
comparison with other South American countries.183 Part of the reason that the police 
ranked so low during the 1990s was due to several instances of police killing or forcibly 
removing homeless people from commercial districts at the request of local 
businessmen.184 Colombia’s inspector general has worked to address these challenges 
and hold police accountable. The inspector general office found that from 2001–2004, 
“the police have been punished 339 times, 216 for human rights violations.”185 Although 
autonomy in the police has presented a challenge to reform, the government was able to 
coordinate large-scale dismissals of problem police officers throughout the chain of 
command and institute some reforms in 1993 and 2003.186 The hierarchical structure of 
police and division between police ranks has limited institutional corruption even though 
corruption exists.187  
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The inspector general of the police is an internal organization that primarily deals 
with enforcing internal rule violations rather than pursuing corruption and misconduct.188 
Other oversight committees have also been created, but with limited success. One 
example was a Police Commissioner office that was created and then closed three years 
later because it failed to accomplish any of its goals.189 Although oversight is a 
challenge, it is estimated “that the head of the police in 1995 dismissed between 3 and 12 
percent (12,000 policemen) of the whole force.”190 This percentage illustrates that 
problem officers are being removed from the force through internal means even though 
legal accountability for these problem officers may be limited. The attorney general and 
inspector general of Colombia are examples of two organizations external to the police 
that provide oversight.191 They struggle with the large scale of their area of responsibility 
because it includes all public officials and not just the police.192 The inspector general 
prosecuted 120 police officers during the course of 250 investigations between 1998 and 
2003.193 
D. MILITARY RULE 
One factor that has influenced the development of Colombia’s political landscape 
has been the interaction of the military with the government. The Colombian military has 
only overthrown the government a few times in its history with the most recent time 
being when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla removed President Laureano Gómez from 
power in 1953.194 It was the first time the military had taken over since the coup by 
General José María Melo in 1854, which means Colombia had nearly 100 years of 
civilian rule before 1953.195 Compared to other countries in South America, Colombia 
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has not experienced a lot of interference from the military. The number of times the 
military has taken over is few, and when it has come into power, its rule has not lasted 
long. General Rojas’ rule was approximately 60 years ago and it only lasted until 1957 
when the government peacefully transitioned back to civilian control.196 The military’s 
time in power was not marked by significant institutional change or political 
oppression.197 The nature of Colombia’s transition to democracy has ensured that the 
military has left little remaining legacy on the institutions of Colombia. It has contributed 
to the political opportunity structure that allowed the Medellín Model to develop and for 
it to be a product of civilian organizations. 
The National Front replaced General Rojas, which was a formal agreement 
between the Conservative and Liberal parties that ensured each side would share power 
throughout the different bodies of the government and that control of the presidency 
would alternate between the two parties.198 This agreement reduced the conflict between 
the two largest parties, but marginalized and frustrated those who belonged to an omitted 
party, such as the Communist Party.199 This exclusion eventually led to armed revolt and 
the development of revolutionary groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) in 
1962 and the FARC in 1966.200 As a reaction to the violence spread by the ELN and 
FARC, paramilitary groups formed to protect economic and political interests.201 These 
armed forces have had a major impact on the level of violence and insecurity in Medellín 
and throughout the country. 
E. MEDELLÍN MODEL 
The Medellín Model is made up of a network of programs that work together to 
address the needs of the local community in order to reduce violence and crime. The 
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main needs addressed are education, economic opportunity, safe public spaces, and 
giving a voice to the marginalized. 
1. Peace and Reconciliation Program 
Paramilitary groups in particular were major local players in Medellín and 
contributed to the city’s level of conflict. In 2004, Colombia’s government began 
executing its demobilization agreement with the AUC, which was the country’s largest 
paramilitary group with 31,137 personnel.202 The Medellín Model took the legal 
framework established by the national government and then established a process locally 
to reintegrate the militants back into society both socially and economically.203 Social 
reintegration was primarily accomplished through the healthcare system, which included 
access to psychosocial assistance for the demobilized.204 Economic reintegration was 
executed through the Peace and Reconciliation Program that was developed within the 
Medellín Model, which focuses on education and training.205 Individuals in the 
demobilization program have their skills and interests taken into account for a 
personalized education plan and are given access to whatever level of education they 
need.206 The Medellín Model also incorporates guidance and resources from the national 
level and includes international partners, such as “the International Organization for 
Migration and the Embassy of the Netherlands.”207 It integrates these combined 
resources and efforts to provide demobilized combatants with the opportunity to 
reintegrate into society and pursue legitimate sources of income. It makes it less likely 
that their only way to earn money is through illegal means, which would draw them into 
one of the local gangs or drug trafficking organizations. 
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One of the main institutions used for the education of the demobilized is the 
Training Center for Peace and Reconciliation (CEPAR). It provides instruction from 
elementary school level through high school, as well as access to technical training.208 
CEPAR uses a comprehensive program that helps to expedite completion of high school 
so the demobilized combatants can quickly transition to further training or enter the job 
market.209 Participants in the program are not limited to CEPAR itself, but can enroll at 
any school in Medellín.210 Thus, they still receive personalized guidance and progress 
monitoring through the program, but are able to go to school in their home 
neighborhood.211  
To encourage the successful completion of school, CEPAR reaches out to the 
student’s family and provides daycare for the children of those in the program.212 This 
assistance allows the participants to focus on academics and helps to lower obstacles to 
them turning their lives around. Those who desire to move onto higher education are 
given access to grants from public and private institutions, which include the mayor’s 
office of Medellín and the Edupaz Fund.213 The Peace and Reconciliation Program works 
as one strand in the web of institutions that make up the Medellín Model. 
b. Economic Opportunity 
Participants in the program are networked with the Bank of Opportunities and the 
Zonal Business Development Centers (CEDEZO) to provide them access to loans that 
can be used to start an entrepreneurial business.214 Between the years 2004 and 2010, 
over 5,500 demobilized combatants participated in the Peace and Reconciliation 
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Program.215 Almost half of those who participated took advantage of the educational 
opportunities provided by the program.216 Approximately 500 participants found 
employment through the Peace and Reconciliation Program. In 2010, 129 former 
paramilitary members had completely readjusted to society and were ready to be released 
from the program.217 The program’s multifaceted approach has received positive 
recognition from the national and international community. The Peace and Reconciliation 
Program “was recognized as one of the best practices by the Dubai Awards.”218 It was 
also recognized by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations for its 
utilization of psycho-social activities for the demobilized and their families to help them 
to reintegrate into society.219 The Colombian government has taken it as a model to be 
implemented throughout the country, which means the processes developed and 
improved in Medellín could influence the demobilization program implemented if peace 
is finally reached between the Colombian government and the FARC.220  
2. Youth Programs 
To show that former paramilitary members are not the only ones given access to 
assistance, the Medellín Model includes three programs that provide training and job 
assistance to youth in impoverished areas, which are Young Force, Youth With Future, 
and Young Apprentices.221 A wide range of opportunities is provided through the 
Medellín Model’s different youth programs and CEDEZO.222 The city’s youth are a key 
focus because they represent nearly a quarter of the population, but 59 percent live below 
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the poverty line.223 Previous administrations have failed to acknowledge how vulnerable 
youth are and failed to develop programs that addressed their needs.224  
Young Force provides training and qualification in conflict resolution to people in 
the 14 to 29 age group who live in high crime areas of the city.225 It also reaches out to 
young adults released from prison to facilitate their transition back into society, so they 
have opportunities other than criminal activities.226 Young Force has been able to reach 
out and provide training to over 20,000 men and women since its creation.227 It has also 
provided 2,000 ex-convicts and parolees services to reenter society and pursue education 
or work opportunities.228 Young Force was recognized by the Inter-American 
Development Bank as the best program in a contest held for Good Practices in Crime 
Prevention.229 Youth with Future focuses on those from impoverished backgrounds who 
are in the 16 to 29 age group and have dropped out from school.230 The program provides 
them education opportunities to continue toward higher education or receive technical 
training to improve their employment prospects.231 Young Apprentices works through 
the National Learning Service (SENA) to provide students with internship opportunities 
at a wide range of businesses and NGOs.232 
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3. Economic Opportunity 
CEDEZO were created to provide the city’s marginalized population access to 
loans, financial services, and entrepreneurial programs.233 They also work to connect 
products produced by small businesses in Medellín to national and international 
markets.234 CEDEZO work to develop business networks within the city for them to 
coordinate efforts and receive guidance from business and academic leaders.235 Before a 
CEDEZO builds these business networks, it analyzes the economic landscape of each 
comuna where a CEDEZO is established.236 Currently, 11 CEDEZO are located in the 
poorest neighborhoods of Medellín.237 CEDEZO move beyond just providing access to 
loans, but rather help entrepreneurs overcome obstacles to success through creating 
networks and providing training and guidance by experts.238 Poverty is seen as one of the 
key contributors to insecurity in Medellín, which is why much of the Medellín Model 
focuses on providing economic and educational opportunities. 
4. Local Governance Committees 
The Medellín Model identifies and weighs security issues in each comuna rather 
than creating a single style of program applied the same everywhere.239 The citizens of 
each comuna are encouraged to participate in the process of addressing the local 
issues.240 Civic culture is enhanced through “the creation of citizen networks, security 
fronts, security schools and area security committees.”241 The Medellín Model rejects 
traditional policing relationship between police and citizens to ensure that crime 
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deterrence and rehabilitation are active parts of the effort to promote community 
policing.242 The mayor’s office endorses the formation of LGC, which are key 
organizations in the Medellín Model: 
The LGC are administrative bodies in charge of coordinating and 
articulating the plans, programs and projects created by the municipal 
administration for public order, security and coexistence in each comuna 
and locality. These bodies consist of the police inspector, the family 
commissar, the commander of the police station, a social technician and 
the chairman of the local administration board. The purpose of these 
committees is to diagnose the security, coexistence and public order 
problems in each comuna and locality in order to lead and leverage 
specific actions aimed at solving them and giving legitimacy to the 
presence of the state in their territories.  
The LGC plays the role of an interlocutor between the central 
administration and the communities; it implements pedagogical strategies 
to encourage citizen participation, a culture of respect for life, legality, 
self-regulation, matters pertaining to the Government, and human rights; 
the committee prepares local security and coexistence plans; promotes the 
exercise of civil rights and social guarantees; help preserve public order 
and control any behaviors that go against it, implementing their actions 
according to applicable regulations; they convene, coordinate and provide 
constant accompaniment for the citizens coexistence councils and are 
leaders in the participative and pluralistic process to create the manual for 
community coexistence.243 
LGC act as fusion centers where the different public and private organizations 
come together to reduce insecurity in Medellín. They provide a point of access to the 
political system for people who live in previously marginalized communities. LGC are 
even given their own capacity to address the concerns of the community directly because 
the participative budget process allows five percent of the allotted funds to be used at the 
discretion of the local leadership.244  
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5. Information Sharing 
Focusing on the security needs of each individual neighborhood and identifying 
specific focal points localizes security.245 A key feature of the process to identify needs 
and problem areas was the creation of the Information System for Security and 
Coexistence (SISC), which is a shared database system that allows separate 
neighborhoods and agencies to coordinate efforts and insight.246 The SISC pools data on 
criminal activity with a focus on “the dynamics of the conflict, homicide and high-impact 
crime, the operation of the justice system and family violence.”247 The SISC receives 
information contributions from a variety of sources, which include the police, social 
workers, school administrators, health administrators, and local government officials.248 
The SISC improves the ability of program managers, the police, and the local community 
to monitor trends and receive feedback on the impact of the Medellín Model. 
6. Integral Urban Projects 
Integral Urban Projects (PUIs) combine the localization of security and provide 
social opportunity to Medellín’s citizens.249 PUIs include parks, libraries, schools and 
metrocable transportation systems, which provide open and safe areas to facilitate social 
interaction and access to services.250 Included in the plan to increase security through 
PUIs, nearby police Centers for Immediate Attention are constructed as well.251 PUIs 
provide opportunity for positive interaction between the police, state, and local citizens. 
Secure areas and PUIs include the participation of private businesses, and thus far, over 
350 large- to small-sized companies are participating.252 
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The need for PUIs came from the way the city grew more unbalanced and 
fractured over time both physically and socially.253 The growth of violent groups in 
different sections of the city contributed to the breakdown of neighborhood ties 
throughout the city.254 Before the mayor’s office began the process of executing PUIs, it 
commissioned a study in 2004 that found that seven of the city’s 16 comunas scored low 
on the HDI and QLSI.255 These neighborhoods became the focus for PUIs “due to their 
dramatic social and economic conditions, their exposure to social exclusion and spatial 
segregation, and their predisposition to criminal activities and violence.”256 The PUIs 
create physical safe zones and an opportunity for positive interaction between the local 
citizens and the government.257 PUIs are not under the sole direction of governmental 
experts, but instead, the local community plays a key role in the development and 
execution of PUIs.258 PUIs incorporate management teams that combine the efforts of the 
national government, local government, community leaders, private businesses, NGOs, 
and international organizations.259 Funding comes from local taxes, investments from 
private businesses, NGOs, and international organizations.260 The mayor’s office 
maintains transparency in how public funds are contributing to PUIs and their benefits, 
which may have contributed to “a 35% increase in taxes collected during the 2004–2007 
period.”261 This increase resulted because local citizens where able to see how their 
money was being spent and how they are benefiting from it. In the most violent 
neighborhoods of Medellín, Comunas 1 and 2, PUIs helped create 125,000 square meters 
of public safe zones, four bridges to connect isolated communities, 14 parks, 3,439 new 
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jobs, 252 new businesses, increased health care coverage, and 98 percent school coverage 
of local youth.262 PUIs are key structures of social urbanism that facilitate social 
inclusion and civic culture throughout Medellín. 
7. Human Rights Boards 
Human Rights Boards (HRBs) that have been established in several comunas of 
the city and supported by the Medellín Model help to provide feedback to the police and 
local government about concerns of the local citizens.263 The first HRB was created in 
Comuna 6 in 2010. It functions as a body that resists the exploitation of the local 
community by state and non-state actors.264 Funding from the municipal level through 
the participatory budget process helps the Board to resist pressure from the state.265 Even 
though HRBs help provide corrective feedback to the police, the police are not seen 
solely as adversaries.266 The police are seen as key allies in bringing security to the 
neighborhood.267 The HRBs also help coordinate public events that work to counter the 
influence of criminal organizations and legitimize the influence of the state.268 HRBs are 
key to the Medellín Model because they ensure that local citizens have a voice and are 
able to provide feedback to improve the quality of its programs. 
8. Trends 
In Medellín, concern has been raised that the reduction in violence that the city 
experienced in the early 2000s was not due to the Medellín Model, but rather a balance of 
power established by paramilitary leaders.269 After one of the main leaders, Don Berna, 
was arrested in 2008, the homicide rate started to rise, but not to a level that was close to 
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the rate in the 1990s.270 In just one year, “the homicide rate nearly tripled to 94.5 in 
2009.”271 This rise was not permanent though because in 2012, the homicide rate had 
gone down to 52 per 100,000.272 During this same time frame from 2008 to 2012, the 
city’s Generalized Inequality Index (GINI) coefficient decreased 7.8 percent to 0.500.273 
The Medellin Model has had to shift the focus of its CEDEZO program from 
microbusinesses to building small and medium businesses.274 It made this shift because it 
found that many microbusinesses tend to stagnate and never grow into small 
businesses.275 Ebbs and flows will likely continue in the level of violence in Medellín. 
Although drugs, gangs, and violence will continue to be challenges in Medellín, the 
Medellín Model is a multi-faceted and responsive program to address insecurity.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO MODELS 
This chapter provides an analysis of the similarities and differences between the 
two models, Medellín Model and UPP, to answer the author’s research questions. It also 
looks at whether the hypotheses of this thesis are correct.  
How different are the two models? How did they evolve? If they are indeed 
different, why did both cities adopt such different approaches to a similar challenge 
(public insecurity and crime)? 
A. DIFFERENCES 
Both cities adopted their program to address a lack of security in their city, but 
chose a different approach. The UPP program appears to have two main pillars in the 
UPP itself and UPP Social, but the UPP units are the focus of the program. The police of 
the UPP are the first representatives of the state to enter the favela after the military and 
MP push out the gangs and make up a majority the government personnel working in the 
favela. UPP Social only leaves a few officials after the initial assessment of the 
community has been completed. The UPP program does not require the participation of 
locals to achieve its main goal and does not budget money for community leaders to be 
used toward their primary concerns. The program primarily pushes the criminals out of 
the area, but does not have the root causes of insecurity as its focus. The UPP program 
does address public security, but does it through police reform. This reform was 
developed and implemented from the regional level of government in the Public Safety 
Secretary’s office for the state of Rio de Janeiro. The Medellín Model has a more 
balanced approach that seeks to address multiple areas of need to include social 
insecurity, physical insecurity, education, social cohesion, and economic insecurity. The 
Medellín Model seeks to address the underlying causes for crime and violence. The 
Medellín Model is focused on the needs of the city as a whole while the UPP program 
focuses on the favelas established throughout Rio de Janeiro. Medellín’s public security 
program is being applied throughout the city and not just in a few neighborhoods like the 
UPP program. The Medellín Model comes from the bottom up because it was developed 
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and implemented by the mayor of Medellín’s office, but it brings in funding and guidance 
from the state, national, and international levels. 
B. SIMILARITIES 
Despite significant differences between the UPPs of Rio de Janeiro and the 
Medellín Model, the two programs are similar. They both prioritize physical security and 
have incorporated the use of police and military forces to confront violent illegal 
organizations. In the case of the Medellín Model, that experience was Operation Orion in 
2002, which was before the development of the Medellín Model, but during UPP 
operations, this use of overwhelming force is used with each new favela where the UPP 
sets up operations. Prioritizing physical security makes sense when unarmed 
representatives, such as public works personnel, utilities employees, social workers, and 
educators, could be easily threatened and attacked by armed criminals. If unarmed 
representatives of the state are unable to perform their duties then the legitimacy of the 
state cannot be reestablished in a marginalized area. 
Both Colombia and Brazil have police forces that struggle with corruption and 
human rights violations. The government in each country has tried to provide greater 
oversight and address these issues with limited success because each force maintains a 
level of autonomy from the national state. Colombia’s police autonomy is tied to its long 
history of separation from political parties and the military, while Brazil’s police 
autonomy is tied to its connection to the military and the military’s ability to influence 
the national government. The record of human rights violations for each police force is 
tied to the nature of violent conflict they face. The police in Colombia must combat 
armed revolutionary forces like the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups like the AUC, 
international drug traffickers, and local gangs. The police in Brazil must combat drug 
traffickers and local gangs, but also has as part of its history the experience of being used 
by the military dictatorship to suppress political opposition. On the Corruption 
Perceptions Index for 2015, Transparency International scores Brazil at 38 and a rank of 
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76 of 116 counties while Colombia scores at 37 and a rank of 83.276 Tied to the police 
corruption in both Brazil and Colombia is the low wages that police receive and poor 
police oversight in each country. Each country has ineffective accountability 
organizations external to the police, such as the Ministério Público in Brazil, as well as 
Colombia’s attorney general and inspector general of Colombia. 
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
The first chapter hypothesized that different patterns of democratization have 
shaped and affected public security programs in both Brazil and Colombia, and that the 
philosophy of security in each city influenced how their respective public security 
program was structured and implemented. 
The preceding discussions provided an analysis on how each program is different 
in the previous section titled “Differences.” The two programs are different in what 
public security challenges they address, where in the city the program is implemented, 
how the program relates to the local community, and what level of government runs the 
program. The Medellín Model evolved out of the mayor’s office attempt to address the 
lack of education, economic opportunity, safe community spaces, and presence of the 
state that was contributing to high levels of crime and violence around the city. The UPP 
program evolved out of the state of Rio de Janeiro’s public safety secretary working to 
reintegrate the state back into the favelas of the city of Rio de Janeiro and to push the 
criminal gangs that controlled the favelas out. Looking at why Rio de Janeiro and 
Medellín adopted different programs confirms the author’s hypotheses about their 
transition to democracy and security philosophy. 
1. Transition to Democracy 
By looking at the history of each program, it was possible to see that the political 
opportunity structure present in each country influenced how each public security 
program was developed. First, remember that Fuentes defines the political opportunity 
structure by “the nature of the transition to democracy, access to the political system, and 
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the structure of the police.”277 Just over 30 years ago, Brazil transitioned from an 
oppressive military regime that had been in power for over 20 years. The transition to 
democracy was slow and done at the pace set by the military, which allowed government 
officials involved in human rights violations to escape serious punishment and for the 
institutional structure and culture that was organized by the military to continue past the 
transition. The ability for the MP, which the UPP are structured under, to be tried in 
military courts instead of civilian courts for crimes, keeps the MP connected to the 
military and autonomous from civilian oversight. This autonomy gives the MP significant 
political influence, which is why as the UPP program was developed, it was able to exert 
influence over how it would operate. Since the MP was involved in the development of 
the UPP program, the police are the primary agents for executing the program. The UPP 
program is primarily police reform that focuses on physical security and pushing gangs 
out of the favelas.  
UPP Social does address social needs, but it only goes into a favela once the UPP 
says it is safe to do so and only a few UPP Social officials are established in each pacified 
favela. Priority is given to reestablishing public services in the community, but not much 
is done to foster civil society or incorporate the public as a participating agent in the 
pacification process. The media does sound “fire alarms,” which cover cases of 
corruption or expose police killings that occur under the UPP program, but the media 
tends to view the UPP positively.278 The UPP is not accountable to the public in any 
significant way and a feedback process has not been set up as with the Medellín Model. 
Since feedback from the community has not been institutionalized into the UPP program, 
those living in the favelas have little recourse besides public protest. Even in pacified 
favelas, these protests can lead to violent suppression by the police. In 2014, a popular 
local dancer named Douglas Rafael Pereira da Silva was shot and killed during a police 
operation, which led to public outcry.279 During the protest that followed, Edilson Silva 
                                                 
277 Fuentes, Contesting the Iron Fist, 6.  
278 “Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in 
Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process,” 43–44. 
279 Amnesty International, You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, 77 
 45 
dos Santos, who was unarmed, was shot in the head as police were firing at a crowd to 
disperse them.280 The police officer accused of killing da Silva was charged with murder, 
but released from custody until the trial.281 The police officer accused of killing dos 
Santos was charged by the Public Prosecution Service, but later, a criminal court judge 
who cited that self-defense was involved, dismissed the charges.282 This resulting 
situation provides a stark example of the continued police impunity that still exists under 
the UPP program. In sum, media coverage and exposure of human rights abuses, does not 
result in responsive government. 
Colombia transitioned to democracy from military rule almost 60 years ago. Not 
only was that period twice as long ago as Brazil’s period, but military rule was also only 
for four years and was not marked by significant political oppression. Colombia also has 
a long history of international influence from the United States. The United States has 
supported the Colombian government’s efforts to reestablish governance over areas 
controlled by the FARC and to eliminate coca agriculture through financial support, 
equipment support, and guidance.283 To some extent, this continued U.S. influence has 
contributed to Colombia’s early adoption of community oriented policing. Brazil does not 
share this same experience with international influence. Colombia’s history has allowed 
the police to remain independent from the military, but connected to civilian institutions. 
The mayor of Medellín has the authority to provide guidance to the local police, which 
allowed the program to be developed by the mayor’s office and to incorporate the police 
as a part of it rather than as the main actor. Thus, the Medellín Model was allowed to 
develop as a holistic approach to public security that addressed social needs, as well as 
physical security.  
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Brazil’s disjointed police structure contributes to a lack of police accountability to 
the public and civilian authorities. The heritage of the military courts system and the 
weakness of other oversight mechanisms also contribute to police autonomy and a 
resistance to change. This lack of community influence on the police means that any type 
of police reform would have to come down from the political hierarchy rather than up 
from the community level. The UPP program developed its philosophy to appeal to the 
MP lobby and politicians because it needed their support to get the program 
implemented. This philosophy that developed was one that prioritized physical security, 
which contributed to the program’s use of waves that included the use of overwhelming 
force first and addresses social issues last. Having physical security as its priority also 
means that the organization that is best set up to achieve the goal is the police and not 
government employees. The focus on utilizing the police is seen in the program’s four 
basic goals: 
(1) police coercion was to be used against the armed criminal gangs that 
had taken control of certain “territories” (2) police activity was to be 
raised to a level where it was no longer worth engaging in criminal 
activities (3) the police were to be granted a permanent presence in 
pacified communities (4) support was to be given by the police for policies 
of social inclusion being introduced by other agencies.284 
All the goals include the police as the primary agent for representing the state and 
for addressing the issues in the community. 
The political autonomy of mayors in Colombia allowed Medellín’s mayor to 
develop a program with the help of intellectuals and NGOs that focused on addressing 
social issues that contribute to crime and insecurity, such as poverty, lack of education, 
and marginalization.285 This philosophy of improving public security by addressing the 
roots of public insecurity contributed to a program that relies on social programs and 
incorporates that police, but does not use the police as the primary agent of the state. The 
public is not just the focus of the program’s implementation, but they are key participants 
                                                 
284 Carneiro, “The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro,” 8. 
285 Gutierrez et al., “The Importance of Political Coalitions,” 3139. 
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as well. The importance of incorporating the local community led to the development of 
LGCs, which bring the community into all aspects of implementing the program and even 
provide them with their own funds to address issues prioritized by the community.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis has shown how the nature of the transition to democracy and 
philosophy of security can influence how a public security program is developed and 
implemented. However, it is also important to look at what level of government has the 
political and economic capacity to develop a program. The UPP program was developed 
at the state level of government because that level of government is in charge of the MP. 
The Secretary of Public Security provides guidance to the MP and was the same office 
that developed the UPP program. The state level of Rio de Janeiro was also able to 
provide the funding to implement the program. Having the program come down from the 
state level to the city level gives it a top down structure. In Colombia, the mayor of 
Medellín is able to provide guidance to the local police and was able to use funds 
available from the state run utility companies to implement the program. Since the 
program comes from the city level and incorporates the local community as a key part of 
the process it can be seen as a bottom up program structure. Providing the community 
with the opportunity to influence the implementation and local direction of the program 
through the LGCs, HRBs, and participative budgeting keeps the focus of the Medellín 
Model at the community level. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the UPP program and Medellín 
Model to provide a better understanding of each program and how the transition to 
democracy and security philosophy influenced the development of the program. It found 
that in each country, the transition to democracy influenced the political and police 
structure, which influenced what part of the government had the political opportunity to 
institute reform. Brazil’s transition to democracy allowed the influence of the military 
regime to continue in the country’s institutions, as seen in the structure of the police and 
its lack of accountability to the government and the public. The influence of the police 
and its autonomy meant that it needed to be appeased during the development of public 
security reform, which caused the reform to be focused on the actions of the police who 
play the main actors in its implementation. The opening waves of the UPP program rely 
heavily on traditional policing measures, and it is not until physical security is established 
that community police by the UPP police begins. Social issues are not addressed until 
UPP Social is given clearance by the UPP to come into the community. The philosophy 
of pushing the gangs out of the favelas and prioritizing physical security keeps the focus 
of the program on policing and not addressing the social issues that may be contributing 
to the prevalence of crime in the city.  
Colombia’s transition to democracy left little remaining military impact on the 
government and its institutions. Having a military that was not intrusive into politics 
made it possible to have a police structure independent of the military and more 
subordinate to the government. Colombia still faces challenges of police accountability 
because of the weakness of its oversight institutions, but the government does not face 
opposition from the military in its effort to improve accountability. The mayor’s office 
then had the political opportunity to create a program that incorporated the police, but did 
not make the police the main actor to obtain the support of the police. Since the mayor of 
Medellín was able to gather the guidance from academics and different organizations, he 
was able to create a public security reform program that addressed multiple issues of 
public insecurity simultaneously. The Medellín Model’s use of LGCs, HRBs, and 
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participative budgeting incorporates the members of the community as key actors and 
provides a process for the community to provide feedback, and thus, improve the 
program. 
Both Brazil and Colombia have tried to improve police accountability with 
limited success. For each public security program to have continued success, the police 
need to be held accountable to the public. The government of each country should 
continue to work to strengthen the authority of their accountability programs that are 
external to the police. In Brazil, the authority of the Ministério Público over the police 
could be increased so that it cannot be blocked by the police from doing its job. Bringing 
the MP under the authority of civilian courts and breaking its connection to the military 
would go a long way to limiting police impunity. In Colombia, it could increase the 
capacity of the inspector general to provide oversight by increasing its manning or by 
creating a subsection focused on the police. This new organization would need the 
funding, manning, and authority to investigate and discipline the police for it to be 
successful. Corruption in the police can also be addressed by improving wages and 
ensuring that continued professional training is provided. 
The UPP program could be improved by incorporating some of the fundamentals 
of the Medellín Model, which would include increasing the capacity of UPP Social and 
increasing community involvement. Creating LGCs that have the ability to influence the 
focus of UPP Social in that community could be a positive step. Providing the LGC with 
independent funds would allow it to address its priority concerns instead of having to 
accept the focus that UPP Social decides upon. To see lasting gains, the UPP program 
needs to continue to address the roots of public insecurity instead of primarily pushing 
criminals out of one favela and into another. The program needs to continue to expand to 
new communities and work to transition gang members to legitimate activities. It can be 
done by providing education and economic opportunity as in the Medellín Model’s Peace 
and Reconciliation Program. The UPP program should not just increase the cost and risk 
of being a criminal, but also increase the incentives for being a law abiding citizen, which 
creates a push and pull effect toward legitimacy for those involved in criminal activity. 
The UPP program needs to provide a way to reduce the number of gang members instead 
 51 
of moving them out of one community to the next. Increasing the avenues for local 
citizens to provide feedback to the program and being responsive to it will allow the 
program to improve over time and adapt to unforeseen challenges. 
There is room for further study within the cases presented by this thesis and other 
cases. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, an even more in-depth study and analysis of 
Brazil and Colombia could provide better insight into how their transition to democracy 
and public security philosophy influenced their respective programs. Examining other 
countries, such as Argentina or Chile, could help show whether this thesis’s hypotheses 
hold true with other cases. Seeing the impact of each country’s democratic transition on 
its public security reform illustrates how a country’s military regime can leave a long-
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